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European Memories: Jan Patočka and Jacques Derrida on Responsibility Rodolphe Gasché
Having evoked various reflections and presentations of Europe ranging from Gottfried Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel to Paul Valéry and from Edmund Husserl to Martin Heidegger, Jacques Derrida remarks in The Other Heading that these European discourses on Europe are dated. Although they are modern discourses and even "the most current, [and, indeed,] nothing is more current," they also date back somehow.
1 They are always already traditional discourses in the sense that they speak of Europe from the perspective of its end, as an end (in the sense of telos) about to be realized or something that is no longer-something that has come to an end. As the heirs of these discourses, Europeans-like all inheritors-are in mourning. But, according to Derrida, Europe must also assume these traditional discourses, particularly those aspects of them that are of acute concern today. The Europeans' capital, their first and most current duty is to take responsibility for that heritage. Derrida writes: "We bear the responsibility for this heritage, right along with the capitalizing memory that we have of it. We did not choose this responsibility; it imposes itself upon us" (OH, p. 28 ). This responsibility is ours insofar as (qua Europeans) we are heirs of the discourses in question.
In the brief remarks devoted in Specters of Marx to the concept of inheritance in general, Derrida points out that to be means to inherit. One is an heir even before one explicitly assumes or rejects a particular inheritance. "That we are heirs does not mean that we have or that we receive this or that, some inheritance that enriches us one day with this or that, but that
Derrida, Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New
International, trans. Peggy Kamuf (New York, 1994) , p. 54.
3. Derrida's reference to heritage, and the responsibility to the latter, does not necessarily imply that he would dismiss the notion of tradition. Let us only emphasize that, in contrast to Gadamer, Derrida does not hold tradition to be homogeneous. Indeed, within the tradition one finds "dominant structures, discourses which silence others, by covering over or destroying the archive" (Derrida, Politics of Friendship, trans. George Collins [London, 1997] , p. 233). Even though repeatedly he notes that "it is no longer possible to use seriously the words of tradition" (Derrida, "Some Statements and Truisms about Neologisms, Newisms, Postisms, Parasitisms, and Other Small Seismisms," trans. Anne Tomiche, in The States of Theory, ed. David Caroll [New York, 1990] , p. 74), and that in the end all concepts of the tradition have to be put aside, he also "reaffirms the necessity of making recourse to them, at least, in a crossed-out fashion" (Derrida, Psyché: Inventions de l'autre [Paris, 2003], p. 390; my trans.) . Responsibility to the tradition and its deconstruction go hand in hand.
the being of what we are is first of all inheritance, whether we like it or know it or not." Indeed, Derrida continues, "inheritance is never a given, it is always a task"; it is something still before us, to which we have to bear witness as that which "we are insofar as we inherit."
2 For Europeans, this task consists above all in being such that they assume the memory of Europe. To be by taking responsibility for their inheritance in no way reveals nostalgia or traditionalist fervor. On the contrary, understood as a task, the affirmation of this inheritance does not exclude; indeed, it may even call for a radical transformation of what has been handed down. The prime duty of the European is to take responsibility for this heritage, that is, the modern tradition of reflecting on European identity.
3 This is so not only because these discourses concern being European but also because such identity is always established in relation to alterity, to the other, to the non-European. Responsibility toward this heritage is thus also responsibility to the other. It consists in the double injunction of being faithful to "an idea of Europe, [to] a difference of Europe, but [to] a Europe that consists precisely in not closing itself off in its own identity" (OH, p. 29) . In other words, the responsibility that Europeans bear for all of the traditional discourses on European identity, of which "old Europe seems to have exhausted all the 6. Moreover, Derrida does not seem to have been familiar with the basic tenets of Patočka's later phenomenology, in particular his reinterpretation of the Husserlian conception of the lifeworld. According to Patočka, the natural world is constituted by three movements that are fundamental for understanding his reference to the exceptional (the orgiastic, demonic, or sacred), the inauthenticity of everydayness, and, above all, the motif of the care of the soul. Nonetheless, Derrida's reading of the essay in question is a very fine account of Patočka's thought. possibilities," is thus a responsibility toward responsibility, indeed, toward the concept of responsibility itself (OH, p. 26) .
At this point, however, I would only like to highlight the fact that for Derrida the prime responsibility of the European is one toward the tradition of the discourses and counterdiscourses concerning his own identification. This point is made even more explicitly, though in more general terms, in For What Tomorrow . . . A Dialogue, where Derrida remarks that "the concept of responsibility has no sense at all outside of an experience of inheritance."
4 We should remind ourselves of it as we turn toward Derrida's discussion of a discourse on Europe that he characterizes as heretical "with respect to all the important [or grand] European discourses."
5 All the possibilities of the grand discourses of Europe have apparently been exhausted. And, yet, Jan Patočka's views on Europe and European responsibility, which have the capacity to produce explosive implications if extended radically, sound a heretical note within the traditional discourses of the modern Western world, not the least because they also seek to break the ties to a certain memory and to a certain tradition.
In the first two chapters of The Gift of Death, Derrida engages Patočka's genealogy of European responsibility as it is presented in Heretical Essays in the Philosophy of History. To my knowledge, this is the only occasion on which Derrida has broached the work of the Czech phenomenologist. Although his discussion is limited to the Heretical Essays in the Philosophy of History and, moreover, largely to one of its essays ("Is Technological Civilization Decadent, and Why?"), it provides an exemplary reading of Patočka's conception of Europe and responsibility, of its intricacies and ambiguities, as well as of the major tenets of Derrida's own conception.
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Needless to say, The Gift of Death is not limited to a discussion of Patočka's views on Europe and responsibility. In this work, Derrida also engages the thought of Heidegger, Emmanuel Lévinas, and, in particular, Søren Kierkegaard. Although I will briefly, and very schematically, sketch out Derrida's main concerns within the essay as a whole, no comprehensive reading can be attempted here. In any event, we will have to elaborate in some detail on 7. This genealogy also raises the question of whether it is not also modeled in accordance with the tripartite movement that, according to Patočka, makes up the natural world of the human being.
8 So, before turning to Derrida's reading of Patočka, let us first remind ourselves, however briefly, of what this Platonic motif is. The notion of the care of the soul is a fundamental and elementary notion in Plato's earliest dialogues, around which all of Socrates's concerns are gathered. Although this theme is to be found primarily in the Apology, Phaedo, and Alcibiades I, it is, according to Patočka, the central issue not only of all Plato's thought but of Greek philosophy as a whole. Let us recall that for the Greeks the soul-that is, the mover and user of the body-is the human being's true self. As Socrates argues in Alcibiades I, "there is nothing which may be called more properly ourselves than the soul."
8 For the Greek philosopher, the body is only an instrument, or a tool, for a good life. But the prerequisite for a good life is then that the soul be in command of the body. The philosopher's first duty, or responsibility, is, therefore, to get to know himself in order to be able to look to that which is most properly himself, rather than tending to what does not expressly belong to him: money, reputation, honor, as well as anything bodily. The soul achieves not only self-control (sophron) but also purity and transparency within itself by shunning everything corporeal. It is guided in this by the knowledge of what is and emulates the eternal, the unchangeable order of the cosmos, the Divine, or the Good. As is made clear in the Phaedo, such severing of all ties to the body culminates in the care of death, which, as this dialogue shows, is an intrinsic part of the care of the soul. By caring for death-that is, by learning how to face death easily-the soul, having freed itself from any contamination with the body, becomes able "to collect and concentrate itself by itself, trusting nothing but its own independent judgment."
9 Thus, within his lifetime, the philosopher's soul will achieve a state that resembles the one that only the gods should enjoy and will thus also secure its full release from the body upon death. What unmistakably sets Patočka's discourse apart from the traditional discourses on Europe-particularly those of Husserl and Heidegger-is what Derrida calls Patočka's "essential Christianity" (GD, p. 22). Undoubtedly, Derrida makes this point first of all in order to distinguish Patočka's interpretation of the theme of the care of the soul from Heidegger's analysis of care (Sorge) in Being and Time as a fundamental existential structure of Dasein. Heidegger constantly sought to separate his thought from Christianity, while at the same time ontologically recovering-and de-Christianizing-Christian themes and texts by inquiring into their originary possibility. Patočka, on the other hand, "makes an inverse yet symmetrical gesture. . . . He reontologizes the historic themes of Christianity and attributes to revelation or to the mysterium tremendum the ontological content that Heidegger attempts to remove from it" (GD, p. 23). But this reference to an essential Christianity also acknowledges that the emergence of responsibility in the face of everydayness and the sacred is, for Patočka, intimately connected to the history of religion. Patočka is intent on overcoming both the inauthenticity of everydayness and the demonic and the orgiastic that are an escape from it. Plato and Europe establishes Plato as the Greek philosopher who brought the motif of the care of the soul into being and also as the thinker who transformed myth into religion, the one who "recommends . . . faith." All differences considered, "faith, as the Greek philosophers saw it, is the foundation of what we call faith in the Christian tradition"; nevertheless, only Christianity is religion in an eminent sense.
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Indeed, as Derrida remarks, Patočka's thought is remarkably consistent in taking into account the event of Christian mystery as an absolute singularity, a religion par excellence and an irreducible condition for a joint history of the subject, responsibility, and Europe. That is so even if, here and there, the expression "history of religions" appears in the plural, and even if one can only infer from this plural a reference to Judaic, Islamic, and Christian religions alone, those known as religions of the Book. [GD, p. 2] If the genealogy of responsibility developed by Patočka "follows the traces of a genius of Christianity that is the history of Europe" (GD, p. 3), it is precisely because it is only in, or as, Christian Europe that the motif of the care of the soul-the central theme of what is European-is transformed (or, as we will see, could be transformed) into a true principle of responsibility. Christianity is the only religion that can secure the possibility 11. Patočka, Heretical Essays in the Philosophy of History, trans. Erazim Kohak, ed. James Dodd (Chicago, 1996) , p. 106; hereafter abbreviated HE. of a responsibility that is truly European and at the same time really realize the concept of responsibility. What thus sets Patočka's reflections on Europe apart from those of Husserl and Heidegger is precisely the significance of religion-particularly, of the religion par excellence that is Christianity.
The Christianity of Patočka's texts on the care of the soul and European responsibility is not just any Christianity. It is not only an essential but also a heretical conception of Christianity. According to Patočka's highly stratified genealogy of responsibility, the history of the responsible self is built upon the heritage of the Platonic conception of the care of the soul through a series of ruptures and repressions "that assure the very tradition they punctuate with their interruptions" (GD, p. 7). Although the novel twist to which Christianity subjects the theme of the care of the soul consists, according to Patočka, in an "about-face" by means of which Christianity seeks to extricate itself from its Platonic inheritance, Christianity has proved unable to think through and draw the radical implications of its mutation of the theme in question precisely because its overcoming of Platonism is not complete.
11 As Derrida points out, if European Christianity is at its heart still haunted by the persistent presence of a type of Platonism-and of a type of Platonic politics-it is, according to Patočka, because it "has not sufficiently repressed Platonism in the course of its reversal, and it still mouths its words" (GD, p. 23). Now, the specificity of the reversal that the motif of the care of the soul undergoes in Christianity consists in this: the responsibility of the self or of the soul does not derive from knowledge of the Divine, the cosmos, or the Good, but from the soul's exposure to the gaze of an other, ultimately the gaze of God as a Person, a gaze that constitutes the soul as a person and, for that, as a responsible self. Indeed, the Christian version of the care of the soul is unable to come into its own because it continues to subordinate responsibility (and decision making) to knowledge, the knowledge of the Good, just as is the case with the Platonic model. Patočka inscribes his discourse on Europe, responsibility, and politics "within the perspective of a Christian eschatology"-that is, within a happening in which Christianity and, by extension, the only true conception of responsibility are still hampered by the remnants of the Platonic heritage. He is thus forced to acknowledge that something "remains 'unthought' in Christianity. Whether ethical or political, the Christian consciousness of responsibility is incapable of reflecting on the Platonic thinking that it represses, and at the same time it is incapable of reflecting on the orgiastic mystery that Platonic thinking incorporates" (GD, p. 24).
Christianity's inability to determine the notion and status of "the place and subject of all responsibility, namely, the person," is indicative of what remains unthought (GD, p. 24), for, in the Christian mystery, the person is not in a relation to an objectively knowable transcendent object such as the Platonic Good but to God as a Person, to He who transfixes the self by His gaze without being seen Himself. What follows from this inability and neglect of what Patočka judges to be an inadequate thematization is that Christianity remains only on the threshold of responsibility. It doesn't thematize what a responsible person is, that is, what he must be, namely, this exposing of the soul to the gaze of another person, of a person as transcendent other, as an other who looks at me, but who looks without the subject-who-says-I being able to reach that other, see her, hold her within the reach of my gaze. [GD, p. 25] Furthermore, as Derrida concludes, "an inadequate thematization of what responsibility is or must be is also an irresponsible thematization: not knowing, having neither a sufficient knowledge or consciousness of what being responsible means, is of itself a lack of responsibility" (GD, p. 25). In sum then, the Christian version of the care of the soul is, in spite of all its radicalness, "limited by the weight of what remains unthought, in particular its incorrigible Platonism" (GD, p. 28), an unacknowledged debt, which also explains the inadequate thematization of what makes the soul a truly responsible self.
Christianity is also infused with a certain irresponsibility as far as its conception of responsibility is concerned. Patočka's essential Christianity,then, is a heretical conception of Christianity in that "according to the logic of a messianic eschatology" he advocates a more "thorough thematization" of what sets the Christian notion of the care of the soul apart from the Platonic (and Roman) model, which bears not only on its understanding of responsibility but also on its political realization. Derrida writes:
Something has not yet arrived, neither at Christianity nor by means of Christianity. . . . What has not yet come about is the fulfillment, within history and in political history, and first and foremost in European politics, of the new responsibility announced by the mysterium tremendum. There has not yet been an authentically Christian politics because there remains this residue of the Platonic polis. Christian politics must break more definitely and more radically with Greco-Roman Platonic politics in order to finally fulfill the mysterium tremendum. Only on this condition will Europe have a future. [GD, 12. See Paul Ricoeur, "Preface to the French Edition of Jan Patočka's Heretical Essays," in HE, p. ix.
13. Indeed, as Hannah Arendt has pointed out, "Goodness in an absolute sense, as distinguished from the 'good-for' or the 'excellent' in Greek and Roman antiquity, became known in our civilization only with the rise of Christianity" (Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition [Chicago, 1958] , p. 73). The analysis of Goodness provided in The Human Condition and in which Arendt highlights the constitutive secrecy of good works, which must remain hidden even to the one who performs them-a good deed being good only on condition that it is forgotten at the moment it is done-as well as Goodness's intrinsic hostility toward the public realm, converges in The realization of a European politics based on a Christian version of the care of the soul would hinge on drawing upon the full philosophical, religious, and political consequences of what is promised with the emergence of Christian Europe. This, however, is possible only on the condition of a radical rupture with the Platonic heritage, that is, precisely with a model of the care of the soul that is predicated on knowledge, in particular the knowledge of the Good. Undoubtedly, heretical, in the title of Patočka's Heretical Essays in the Philosophy of History, refers, at first, to the vulgar Marxist conceptions of the philosophy of history. But its heresy, which also marks a rupture with Husserl's and Heidegger's views on history, as Paul Ricoeur has noted, derives, as Derrida implicitly suggests, from Patočka's hyperbolic conception of Christianity.
12 "Taken to its extreme," Patočka's text is heretical with respect to the grand discourses on Europe by Husserl and Heidegger because it seems to suggest on the one hand that Europe will not be what it must be until it becomes fully Christian, until the mysterium tremendum is adequately thematized. On the other hand it also suggests that the Europe to come will no longer be Greek, Greco-Roman, or even Roman. The most radical insistence of the mysterium tremendum would be upon a Europe so new (or so old) that it would be freed from the Greek or Roman memory that is so commonly invoked in speaking of it; freed to the extent of breaking all ties with this memory, becoming heterogeneous to it. [GD, p. 29] Patočka's conception of Europe, even though it is a version of the care of the soul, is heretical with respect to all the traditional discourses on Europe because of its attempt to emancipate Europe from the memory of both Athens and Rome-that is to say, from a memory of responsibility that rests on knowledge of the Good or of the universal state. Built exclusively on the mysterium tremendum-in other words, on the unseen gaze of an absolutely self-less Goodness, who shakes the soul (the self or person) because it is unable to adequately respond to this gift of love-Europe is to become something entirely new, something that is no longer responsible to the memory of Athens and Rome.
13 Yet, before we can provide a hint of the many respects with what Patočka-a reader of Arendt-says about this notion, as well as with all the implications that Derrida draws in systematic fashion from this conception in The Gift of Death.
implications of this radical break, it is first necessary to briefly highlight the major aspects of the essential Christian conception of responsibility that orthodox Christianity has failed to make good on. The Platonic responsible self or soul cares for itself and achieves in this manner a resemblance-however temporary-to the gods by measuring itself against the Good. The Christian self 's responsibility rests on its relation to an other. It is neither a relation of the self to itself, nor one that the self can freely choose to take upon itself, nor one that it can ignore. Rather, "the Christian 'reversal' that converts the Platonic conversion in turn, involves the entrance upon the scene of a gift" (GD, p. 40). Patočka argues that, in Christianity, the "responsible life was itself presented as a gift from something which ultimately, though it has the character of the Good, has also the traits of the inaccessible and forever superior to humans-the traits of the mysterium that always has the final word" (HE, p. 106). Understanding responsibility as a gift makes all the difference. Such an understanding makes responsibility into a function of an event, the singular event of a gift by another, which, furthermore, is addressed to the human as a singular human being. In fact, the gift, insofar as it is always directed specifically at this human being, is constitutive of his or her singularity and irreplaceability. But, according to Christianity, responsibility is also a gift that comes from an absolute other, that is, a self-effacing Goodness that gives this gift in selfless love and to which the donee is thus constitutively unable to respond in kind. As a consequence, there is thus a structural disproportion or dissymmetry between the finite and responsible mortal on the one hand and the goodness of the infinite gift on the other hand. . . . It inevitably transforms the experience of responsibility into one of guilt: I have never been and never will be up to the level of this infinite goodness nor up to the immensity of the gift, the frameless immensity that must in general define (in-define) a gift as such. [GD, p. 51] Addressed to finite beings, the selfless gift is constitutive of their singularity; it also condemns such singular beings to guilt inasmuch as they are responsible. Furthermore, the gift of responsibility that occurs in the mysterium tremendum is a gift by a self-denying and self-effacing Goodness, who also remains inaccessible because of its very withdrawal. To be responsible is, in Patočka's words, to stand in an inscrutable relation to "a Person who sees into the soul without being itself accessible to view" and "in whose hands we are not externally, but internally" (HE, pp. 107, 106) . That which makes me responsible is something that remains impenetrable to me-in other words, secret. It is also something that shatters me because I cannot adequately respond to such a self-denying gift. Thus, Platonic responsibility is a function of what Patočka terms looking-in, or looking-intowhat-is (nahlédnutí)-namely, into eternal being-which like the Platonic Good can effectively be known. Christian responsibility, however, is not in the power of the subject, who is overpowered, crushed by it precisely because its source-self-renouncing and self-withdrawing Goodness-remains unfathomable.
14 Finally, as Derrida puts it, the gift of responsibility is a gift by "a goodness whose inaccessibility acts as a command to the donee. It subjects its receivers, giving themselves to them as goodness itself but also as the law" (GD, p. 41)-that is, as a universality to which the donee is subject as a singular and irreplaceable being. As the result of this gift, Christian responsibility, therefore, takes the uniqueness and irreplaceability of the singular individual into account precisely by subjecting him to a universal Law.
Patočka holds that it is only in Christianity that the most powerful plumbing of the depths of responsibility has occurred-in other words, that only here is it conceived in a truly fundamental manner. He can do so because this conception of responsibility articulates, as it were, the only conditions under which responsibility is possible. In Christianity alone, it becomes clear that "responsibility demands irreplaceable singularity" (GD, p. 51). Christian responsibility is also, therefore, tied to a gift of death-of "another death" (GD, p. 40), which is not the one to be found in the Platonic version of the care of the soul. As Derrida reminds us, when Patočka argues that "the mysterium tremendum announces, in a manner of speaking, another death. . . . another way of giving death or of granting oneself death," "the word 'gift' is uttered" (GD, p. 40) . This gift of death is a gift in an eminent sense. It is the gift by the other on which the gift of responsibility itself rests or with which responsibility coincides. Only through this gift of death does access to genuine responsibility become possible because "only death or rather the apprehension of death can give this irreplaceability [without which there can be no true responsibility], for it is only on the basis of it that one can speak of a responsible subject, of the soul as conscience of self, of myself, etc." (GD, p. 51; trans. mod.). This gift is another way of giving oneself death, first and foremost, in the sense of apprehending death. In the originary Platonic version of the care of the soul, the philosopher, by giving himself death as that which will only affect him as a bodily being, frees himself from death; he collects and gathers himself within himself. Derrida writes that the (philosopher's) self "comes into being as such at the moment when the soul is not only gathering itself in the preparation for death but when it is ready to receive death, giving it to itself even, in an acceptation that delivers it from the body, and at the same time delivers it from the demonic and the orgiastic. By means of the passage to death [passage de la mort] the soul attains its own freedom" (GD, p. 40). By contrast, in the Christian paradigm death is apprehended neither as something from which the soul can distance itself through care nor as something from which it can sever itself. Christian death is experienced as intrinsically linked to my selfhood, as precisely something that is exclusively mine, that no one can take from me, or assume for me, and that constitutes my irreplaceability as a singular self. Let us remind ourselves that for Patočka the Christian way in which I give myself death rests on "the gift made to me by God as he holds me in his gaze and in his hand while remaining inaccessible to me, the terribly dissymmetrical gift of the mysterium tremendum" (GD, p. 33). The human being to whom this gift is made is no match for the gift of death that accompanies the responsibility to which God's self-less gift calls me. It is a gift that makes the finite subject tremble in terror because he is unable to adequately respond to it, the gift of an awareness of death as eternal death. Derrida writes: "For what is given in this trembling, in the actual trembling of terror, is nothing other than death itself, a new significance for death, a new apprehension of death, a new way in which to give oneself death or to put oneself to death. The difference between Platonism and Christianity would be above all 'a reversal in the face of death and of eternal death'" (GD, p. 31). Radically guilty in the face of a gift that is addressed to them in their very singularity, humans confront their deaths-that which is irreducibly their own and on which their uniqueness hinges-as the complete extinction of themselves, unless they are redeemed by the grace of God. This gift of death is also the gift of a new way of putting oneself to death in the face of the prospect of eternal death, since in order to merit the grace of God the trembling creature must offer its "whole being . . . in the sacrifice of repentance" (HE, p. 108). What Christianity brings to light is not only the fact that without the singularity or the irreplaceability of the individualthere cannot be any responsible self, but also that if singularity is to be the condition of possibility of responsibility it cannot be a given, but must be constantly in danger of extinction.
The Christian version of the care of the soul plumbs into the soul deeper than Platonism because this responsibility-which originates in the gaze of an unfathomable other-precedes the subject/object relation that informs the classical version of the responsible self. Derrida writes: "The dissym-15. Derrida asks: "Is the reference to this abyssal dissymmetry that occurs when one is exposed to the gaze of the other a motif that derives firstly and uniquely from Christianity, even if it be from an inadequately thematized Christianity? Let us leave aside the question of whether one finds something that at least represents its equivalent 'before' or 'after' the Gospels, in Judaism or in Islam" (GD, p. 28). metry of the gaze, this disproportion that relates me, and whatever concerns me, to a gaze that I don't see and that remains secret from me although it commands me, is, according to Patočka, what promises itself [s'annonce] in Christian mystery as the frightening, terrifying mystery, the mysterium tremendum. Such a terror has no place in the transcendent experience that relates Platonic responsibility to the agathon. Nor does it have any place in the politics that is so instituted. But the terror of this secret exceeds and precedes the complacent relation of a subject to an object" (GD, pp. 27-28; trans. mod.). Yet such a radical way of conceiving responsibility is only announced or is only promised by Christianity. Christianity as a whole cannot be identified with this understanding of responsibility because its persistent Platonism has prevented it from thinking through this deepened conception. What is thus announced by Christianity is perhaps no longer anything Christian unless it is Christian in a hyperbolic sense.
15 In any case, Christianity remains the privileged locus in which the depths of responsibility can best be plumbed.
At this juncture let me return to the Platonic motif of the care of the soul and the first awakening of responsibility that is the core idea of European life, but with which the Christian understanding of the responsible self must also, according to Patočka, make a clear break. Let us thus once again remind ourselves that knowledge of what is eternal-justice, beauty, the Good-is the basis of Greek responsible life. Responsibility itself is something public because it is based upon knowledge, to which everyone has access in principle. It is possible to account for the concept of responsibility and to universally establish what responsibility and being responsible consist of, but such an understanding of responsibility also implies that the responsible self must be able to give reasons for any of his or her actions and beliefs, publicly whenever possible. According to this Platonic conception of responsibility, "not knowing, having neither a sufficient knowledge or consciousness of what being responsible means, is of itself a lack of responsibility. In order to be responsible it is necessary to respond to or answer to what being responsible means" (GD, p. 25). To the extent that the Platonic conception of the care of the soul is the first awakening of and to responsibility and hence that this understanding of responsibility is the first moment in the genealogy of responsibility in (or as) Europe, this demand that knowledge be involved in responsible decision making is at the heart of the history of the concept. It dominates the thought on responsibility in Europe from Plato's to Husserl's reflections on an absolutely selfresponsible universal science. Derrida refers to this Greek moment and endorses it, thus highlighting a certain continuity between his own thought and that of Husserl on this issue when he writes that responsibility consists, "according to the most convincing and most convinced doxa, in responding, hence in answering to the other, before the other and before the law, and if possible publicly, answering for itself, its intentions, its aims, and for the name of the agent deemed responsible" (GD, pp. 26-27). The Greek understanding of responsibility that constitutes the first moment in Patočka's genealogy of responsibility excludes any secrecy. Although the Platonic moment incorporates demonic mystery, there is no place for secrecy and mystery in the philosophy and politics of the Platonic tradition. Everything is in the open, in the light of day, for all to judge. Like Greek political life, Greek civic responsibility "openly declares that secrecy will not be allowed." It "presents itself as a moment without mystery" (GD, p. 33). The Platonic model of responsibility and politics is, consequently, one of democracy.
Yet, since the Christian model of responsibility rests on a deepened interiority and is the gift of a self-less other who remains inscrutable, this new model has a definite place for secrecy, for the mysterium, for the mystical, unlike the Greco-Roman version, which is superseded so radically as to break entirely with its memory. Christian responsibility has its origin in a gift, in a "gift that is not a present," and it is from the outset tied with secrecy for essential reasons. Indeed, as Derrida points out, "a gift that could be recognized as such in the light of day, a gift destined for recognition, would immediately annul itself. The gift is the secret itself. . . . Secrecy is the last word of the gift which is the last word of the secret" (GD, pp. 29-30). Originating in the elusive event of such a gift, even the transition from Platonism and neo-Platonism to Christianity remains obscure; it cannot be simply accounted for in positive terms. But since the gift of responsibility is a gift from a self-effacing Goodness (who holds the human being in its hands from within) to the individual in all his or her creatural singularity, it is "the gift of something that remains inaccessible, unpresentable, and as a consequence secret" (GD, p. 29). The donee is exclusively responsible to the donator, and hence, as Derrida's discussion of the Abrahamic story of the sacrifice of Isaac in the second half of The Gift of Death demonstrates, he or she is relieved of the necessity of explaining his or her deeds to others. Indeed, being the unique addressee of the gift, the responsible individual must, at the limit, relate to others in an irresponsible fashion. How he responds to the divine Law remains secret-that is, unaccounted for-and ultimately secret to him-or herself as well, for such responsible decision making must, in principle, be unaccountable.
How does Derrida respond to this conception of responsibility, a con-ception that is entirely heterogeneous to the Greek one and to the tradition to which it gave rise, one that he has characterized as "the most convincing and convinced doxa"? In seeking to answer this question, let us bear in mind that the Platonic idea of responsibility is the beginning of the genealogy of responsibility in Europe, of the European tradition of thinking about responsibility, although it is, according to Patočka, to be entirely replaced by the Christian model. But the Christian version of responsibility is also part of European memory, which thus consists of at least two different memories regarding what constitutes responsibility, despite Patočka's description of Christian responsibility as thoroughly heterogeneous to its Greek antecedent. Further, since the lingering presence of Platonism in Christianity has prevented a full rupture with the Greek model of responsibility that Christianity is to accomplish, the break with this tradition must be completed if the very essence or future of Europe is ever to be realized. Yet, as we saw at the beginning of this essay, for Derrida the concept of responsibility makes no sense whatsoever without an experience of inheritance. Consequently, responsibility is first and foremost a responsibility for and to the specific traditions of responsibility that have been bequeathed to us. It is, first and foremost, a responsibility before any particular responsibilities to oneself, the other, God, the animal, the world, and so forth. Such responsibility does not exclude selection and critique. But would not any attempt to ignore, reject, or break with one of those legacies be tantamount to irresponsibility? Indeed, if responsibility is first of all a responsibility for and to an inheritance, to abandon or to deliberately renounce a part of the tradition in its entirety would be the gravest irresponsibility, all the more so in the case of a part of the tradition that concerns the concept of responsibility itself. Among the several things that Derrida seeks to achieve in The Gift of Death, the attempt to do justice to the conflicting models of responsibility within the European tradition-that is, also of thinking about Europe itself-prevails. The most insistent concern of The Gift of Death is that of assuming the heritage of responsibility in all its forms-particularly, the most "living" part of it, that which is most current because it continues to put limits on any traditional view on responsibility that would impose itself at the exclusion of all others. All of the other concerns of The Gift of Death presuppose this equitable treatment of the contradictory views on responsibility to be found in the traditional discourses of the modern Western world. But, far from amounting to a wholesale underwriting of all the major positions on responsibility, such responsible treatment does not exclude critique, radical transformation, or the opening to other possible models of understanding responsibility. In fact, as we will see, Derrida's attempt in The Gift of Death to respond responsibly to the various facets of the European heritage of responsibility indeed represents a novel concept of responsibility-that is, a novel conception of Europe. Before we elaborate further on Derrida's response to Patočka in The Gift of Death, a brief and very sketchy outline of what this text seeks to achieve is warranted. We should keep in mind Derrida's observation in the first chapter, "Secrets of European Responsibility," that what separates Patočka's interpretation of the motif of the care of the soul from Heidegger's influence is its essential Christianity. Whereas Heidegger constantly seeks to separate himself from Christianity, "repeating on an ontological level Christian themes and texts that have been 'de-Christianized,'" "Patočka makes an inverse yet symmetrical gesture" by ontologizing "the historic themes of Christianity and attribut [ing] to revelation or to the mysterium tremendum the ontological content that Heidegger attempts to remove from it." Thus, Derrida holds that Patočka's gesture "amounts to the same thing" as Heidegger's because it is symmetrical and merely the inverse. He adds that Patočka's "own heresy [regarding Christianity] intersects with what one might call, a little provocatively, that other heresy, namely, the twisting or diverting by which the Heideggerian repetition, in its own way, affects Christianity" (GD, p. 23). The Gift of Death is, of course, not limited to the mapping of the similarities and differences between Patočka and Heidegger; it also includes an analysis of Lévinas and, above all, of Kierkegaard's Protestant interpretation of the Abrahamic story of the sacrifice of Isaac. It is in The Gift of Death that Derrida seeks to establish the matrix, if I may call it that, that at once makes these four undeniably distinct positions on responsibility possible but also limits their range, distinctiveness, radicalism, and even their originality. Indeed, by inquiring into the various modalities of giving (oneself) death and of taking death (upon oneself), Derrida develops an economic model that accounts for the different positions on responsibility, their mutual contamination and passage into one another-in particular, as regards their overdetermination by themes of Christianity, Platonism, and deliberate de-Christianization, as well as of Judaism. This concern with the intersections between distinct positions also frames Derrida's discussion of Patočka's dismissal of the Platonic conception of responsibility on the basis of a decided predisposition toward Christianity's potential to conceive responsibility, which is not yet adequately thematized, hence, outstanding.
As we have seen, to conform to the most convincing and convinced doxa, that is, the Platonic tradition, the responsible party must know what responsibility means. The responsible self must be able to account for what he or she believes and does, and such rendering of accounts should, whenever possible, be public, taking place in a way that is intelligible to everyone. According to what Derrida describes as "the most reliable continuity," the concept of responsibility requires "a decision or responsible action to answer for itself consciously, that is, with knowledge of a thematics of what is done, of what action signifies, its causes, ends, etc." (GD, p. 25) . Where this element of knowledge and justification is lacking, decision making is irresponsible. As Derrida emphasizes, "we must continually remind ourselves that some part of irresponsibility insinuates itself wherever one demands responsibility without sufficiently conceptualizing and thematizing what 'responsibility' means" (GD, ). Yet, although Derrida subscribes to this demand of knowledge and of giving reasons for all decisions, demands that are constitutive of the conception of responsibility from Plato to Husserl, he also agrees with Patočka that to subordinate responsibility to objective knowledge-namely, to established theorems and time-honored norms-amounts to merely executing a program fixed in advance and thus to annulling responsibility. Therefore, he can also write:
Saying that a responsible decision must be taken on the basis of knowledge seems to define the condition of possibility of responsibility (one can't make a responsible decision without science or conscience, without knowing what one is doing, for what reasons, in view of what and under what conditions), at the same time as it defines the condition of impossibility of this same responsibility (if decision-making is relegated to a knowledge that it is content to follow or to develop, then it is no more a responsible decision, it is the technical deployment of a . . . theorem). [GD, p. 24] In addition to acknowledging with Plato and Husserl that the possibility of responsibility is based on knowledge and on rendering accounts, Derrida thus recognizes another equally compelling demand without which responsibility is not possible. The Christian paradigm exemplifies this further condition of possibility of responsibility. According to this new conception, responsibility requires a break with established or sanctified dogmas (including the most convincing and convinced doxa). Rather than seeking conformity, one may have to set oneself apart from what is publicly or commonly accepted. In other words, responsibility is tied here to heresy in all the senses of the term-particularly, as is the case with Patočka, to a "departure from a doctrine, difference within and difference from the officially and publicly stated doctrine and the institutional community that is governed by it" (GD, p. 26). Heresy is not only "an essential condition of responsibility," it "also destines responsibility to the resistance or dissidence of a type of secrecy. It keeps responsibility apart . . . and in secret. And responsibility depends on [tient à] what is apart and secret" (GD, p. 26; trans. mod.) . Indeed, if knowledge remains only on the threshold of a responsible 16. See Derrida, Passions (Paris, 1993) . decision, if a decision is a decision on the condition that it exceeds simple consciousness and simple theoretical determination, the responsible self must, in principle, be unable-that is, run the risk of not being able-to fully account for the singular act constitutive of a responsible decision. It follows from this that responsibility is necessarily linked to the secret-not, of course, in the form of withholding knowledge regarding a specific decision but in the form of an essential inability to ultimately make the reasons for one's actions fully transparent. According to this essential Christianconception of responsibility (which is also, for essential reasons, heretical), decision making without secrecy remains ultimately irresponsible. But, while a decision that is based merely on knowledge annuls responsibility, a decision that forgoes knowledge and defies the demand to give reasons is not without problems that threaten responsibility as well.
As we have seen, there is no place for secrecy or mystery in the Platonic paradigm of responsibility. The Platonic model is a democratic model based on responsibility as universally accessible knowledge and on a demand of transparency. Returning to the memory of Europe, Derrida remarks that as long as Europe pays homage to its Platonic heritage and keeps that memory alive, it "either neglects, represses, or excludes from itself every essential possibility of secrecy and every link between responsibility and the keeping of a secret; everything that allows responsibility to be dedicated to secrecy" (GD, p. 34). But apart from seeking to secure the democratic demand of full transparency and generalized accountability, the fact that this heritage seeks to achieve this demand by neglecting, repressing, or excluding the possibility of secrecy clearly suggests some kind of irresponsibility that is inseparable from the demand in question. As Patočka's analyses of the decadence of modern Europe seek to show, it takes very little for such a democratic model of responsibility and of rendering reason to become totalitarian. Indeed, the legitimate demand intrinsic to the concept of responsibility to publicly account for oneself and one's deeds can easily turn into a means of oppression-as has amply been demonstrated under Stalinism and Zhdanovism in the former Soviet Union, but examples of which can also be found in the U.S. with its obsession with public confession; thus this conception of responsibility based on the demand for knowledge must also, to quote Derrida, "call for respecting whatever refuses a certain responsibility, for example, the responsibility to respond before any and every instituted tribunal" (OH, p. 79) .
16 This right not to respond and to keep a secret is the necessary antidote to a conception of responsibility that, based on knowledge, can always become a tool for the benefit of the worst. But the Christian paradigm of responsibility, which rests on the mysterium tremendum, by which the unique and singular self is called to responsibility by God's gift alone, harbors a similar or rather inverse risk. Christian responsibility requires of the self a complete departure from everything established by doxa and tradition, from all rules and doctrines-in particular, from the necessity of having to give accounts to others-so that one's actions will have been exclusively one's own. As such, it is also fraught with the danger of the worst possible irresponsibility. That Christian responsibility could become tied to the worst repression is a possibility as well. Furthermore, to demand of Europe that it abandon all memory of Platonism and become exclusively Christian-by making secrecy and mystery into the sole condition of European politics and responsibility-is tantamount to calling for a reign of arbitrariness and terror.
Against Patočka's attempt to free Christianity from its Platonic foundation and to conceive of a Europe emancipated from both Athens and Rome, Derrida stresses the need to remain faithful to both aspects of European memory. As the inheritors of both conceptions of responsibility, Europeans are what they are thanks to both of these conceptions and the demands that they articulate; hence, they are responsible for and to them. But this double heritage of the meaning of responsibility is not a simple given and does not entail traditionalist submission. Responsibility for and to both traditions demands first of all acknowledging that any one of these conceptions of responsibility is necessarily fraught with risks and dangers. But such responsibility calls not only for the affirmation of what has been inherited but also for the radical transformation of the heritage. In other words, responsibility for and toward the tradition is inevitably heretical.
In response to Patočka's claim that Christianity has failed to adequately thematize what a Person is-that is, the Person that penetrates the soul with its glance without in turn being seen and that constitutes the soul as a responsible self-Derrida writes that such a reference to "inadequate thematization . . . seems to appeal to some ultimate adequacy of thematization that could be accomplished" (GD, p. 27). Let us remind ourselves of the fact that, in the tradition of responsibility, its Greek moment may come the closest to the ideal of full thematization because it demands knowledge of the reasons, the aim, the meaning of what is done and of the circumstances of one's decisions or actions. Although Derrida emphasizes that we must be continually aware of the fact that whenever we do not sufficiently thematize what responsibility means some irresponsibility insinuates itself into our actions, he also remarks that this is always and everywhere the case. No action, if it is to be a responsible action, is ever consciously or cognitivelysufficiently determined. Derrida adds: "One can say everywhere a priori and nonem-pirically" (GD, p. 26) . If this is so, it is because an action must transcend knowledge to be responsible as well as to include knowledge of what responsibility means. Unless it is the execution of a preestablished theorem or norm, an action merits the title responsible only if it is also effectuated without full theoretical determination. It follows from this that the thematization of responsibility is, for structural reasons, always lacking-even in the case of the Platonic notion of responsibility rejected by Patočka on the basis that it makes responsibility a function of the knowledge of the good. This is even more the case for the heretically Christian conception of responsibility. Derrida observes that thematization is, if not denied, at least strictly limited in its pertinence by that other more radical form of responsibility that exposes me dissymmetrically to the gaze of the other. . . . The concept of responsibility is one of those strange concepts that give food for thought without giving themselves over to thematization. It presents itself neither as a theme nor as a thesis, it gives without being seen [sans se donner à voir], without presenting itself in person by means of a "fact of being seen" that can be phenomenologically intuited. [GD, p. 27] In a move that proves Derrida even more heretical than Patočka, he shows that the concept of responsibility resists all final thematization. It is a "paradoxical concept" in that, in addition to seeking to cognitively unify what responsibility means in one intuition, it also defies such an effort insofar as "it has the structure of a type of secret-what is called, in the code of certain religious practices, mystery. The exercise of responsibility seems to leave no choice but this one, however uncomfortable it may be, of paradox, heresy, and secrecy. More serious still, it must always run the risk of conversion and apostasy: there is no responsibility without a dissident and inventive rupture with respect to tradition, authority, orthodoxy, rule, or doctrine" (GD, p. 27) . With this we have already begun to broach Derrida's own-radically heretical-take on responsibility.
Derrida upholds both injunctions of the tradition in question ratherthan solely privileging the structurally necessary element of secrecy, which Patočka associates with heretical Christianity, to the detriment of the cognitive element in responsibility advanced by Platonism. Yet his innovative interpretation of the heritage of responsibility consists neither in attempting to mediate between both demands nor in establishing their golden mean. Instead, what distinguishes Derrida's interpretation of the Platonic and the Christian heritages is, first of all, the recognition that "the relation between the Platonic and Christian paradigms throughout the history of morality and politics" is defined by the "aporia of responsibility" (GD, p. 24). Re-sponsibility toward this inheritance is itself aporetic; it excludes the choice of one of the inherited conceptions of responsibility at the expense of the other; that is, it requires that both traditions be simultaneously honored without any mitigation of the radicalness of their demands. The injunctions-on the one hand, of full knowledge of one's actions, on the other, of secrecy-are mutually exclusive; moreover, we are unable to account for either of them. Thus, no program exists that could prescribe a way out of this dilemma.
Responsibility for and to this double heritage then requires the invention, each time anew, of a rule according to which both contradictory demands could be met simultaneously or of an action from which such a rule could, after the fact, be construed. In Patočka's parlance, such responsibility toward the memory of Europe is, therefore, inevitably heretical. The relation to this memory is a responsible one only if the contradictory injunctions are met in a way that amounts to a transformation of the tradition that is new each time, one that is singular. Needless to say, what we have seen in regard to the relation to the memory of Europe is valid as well for all other responsible decision making insofar as it takes place against the backdrop of an experience of tradition. Any responsible decision making must face the demand to give reasons without at the same time being reduced to knowledge that would merely be put into effect.
What, then, for Derrida, is European responsibility or responsibility as something specifically European? The conflicting exigencies formulated in the foregoing discussion of the concept of responsibility require the invention of a new way in which to renew, revive, or replay the figure, concept, or idea of Europe. European responsibility is, first of all, this openness to both traditions of responsibility, namely, Platonism and Christianity. It consists in exposure to the radically conflicting demands that these two traditions make upon their heirs as responsible selves. European responsibility is above all the uncompromising willingness to assume the challenge posed by the aporetic nature of inheritance itself-that is, by the constitutive lack of handed-down rules or norms to negotiate contradiction. Consequently, Europe is the name for a responsibility that also goes hand in hand with the necessity of having to invent, each time anew, new ways of meeting mutually exclusive demands. As a simultaneous responsibility to, at first, two opposite traditions, European responsibility consists in not letting one of the traditions overturn, outplay, or outdo the other. By doing justice to its double heritage, and not shunning the necessity of negotiating conflicting demands in the absence of pregiven norms or rules, such responsibility not only entails a radical refusal of traditionalism, for structural reasons, but also is distinguished by openness to other traditions and demands. Indeed, from the moment that Europe is understood as a responsibility to more than one tradition or set of injunctions, its responsiveness andresponsibility extend to all other traditions. Apart from being hospitable to other historically and culturally decisive intra-European differences (such as Judaism and Islam-not in the abstract, however, but with all their shades and forms), as well as to the many minor, or marginal, differences within Europe, this principal openness that the name Europe designates consists as well in the demand of unconditional receptiveness of the tradition of the non-European other. But the demand of such unconditional openness to other traditions and injunctions does not, therefore, exclude the opposite demand, one that is heterogeneous to the former, of conditional or determinate responsibility to oneself. One responsibility comes with the other; none is possible without negotiation with its opposite. Responsibility as Europe-that is, Europe as responsibility-outlines a model of decision making that is respectful of mutually exclusive demands within the concept of responsibility itself and that endures the test of exigencies that, since they are equally valid, cannot be mediated except at the unacceptable price of rendering one exigency subservient to the other. If something like Europe exists and can be thought at all, it must be a conception that for structural or principal reasons is open to responding to still more injunctions, including injunctions from other, or non-European, traditions. Responsibility as Europe coincides with a mode of being for which identity, or selfhood, is possible only in honoring conflicting, strictly speaking aporetic, injunctions. It means that Europe is the idea of an identity predicated on aporetic demands, hence of a mode of being that structurally is infinitely openrather than being closed off-to what is other than oneself. Europe thus understood is a name for a project that Europe has yet to live up to. But Europe, neither a figure nor a concept, neither an idea nor even an idea in the Kantian sense-all of which presuppose a formal unity of what they represent or name-is something that can be realized only by way of approximation, something whose very conception remains open, still-perhaps forever-unfinished, hence, something to come.
